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prohibit introduction of new types of ICBMs through 1980 while they discussed how to deal with this issue in SALT III.

We had also indicated that we could accept a ban on testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs through 1985, except that either side could test and deploy one new ICBM, MIRVed, or non-MIRVed. This would permit the Soviets to go ahead with the new, single RV ICBM, which fits their force structure, and would permit us to proceed with a new MIRVed ICBM, which would fit into our force structure. This would provide for equality and equal security on both sides.

Either of these proposals would represent a satisfactory solution of the ICBM new types issue.

The Secretary next turned to the question of U.S. proposals on SLBMs. He said that in the context of a Protocol ban on new types of ICBMs, we could agree to a ban on new types of SLBMs, allowing for continued testing and deployment of Trident I and the SS-N-18.

19 In the context of a ban on new types of ICBMs through 1985 with  
 20 one exemption, MIRVed or non-MIRVed, for each side, we could agree  
 21 to a ban on new types of SLBMs for the same period, with one  
 22 exemption. In our case this would be the Trident II, and in the  
 23 Soviet case this would be the Typhoon, which they called the RSM-  
 24 52. Under this proposal, Trident I and the SS-N-18 would be con-  
 25 sidered existing types.

26 The Soviet side had proposed a ban on new types of ICBMs for the  
 27 Protocol period, except that each side would be permitted to  
 28 test and deploy one new type of ICBM with a single reentry  
 29 vehicle. This proposal would prevent us from testing any new  
 30 missile, while allowing the Soviets to go ahead with a new single  
 31 RV ICBM for which we have no program and no need. This was in-  
 32 equitable and unacceptable to us.

33 The Soviets had also proposed a ban on new types through 1985,  
 34 with the same exemption for a new single RV ICBM. This proposal  
 35 was even more one-sided:

--The U.S. would have no new ICBM for the duration of the 1985 agreement, since we have no program or requirement for a new single RV ICBM.

--The Soviet Union would, however, be able to deploy its entirely new type of single RV ICBM.

Finally, the Soviets had proposed a ban on the testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs through 1985, without exception. This proposal indicates that they can forego a new single RV ICBM. In that sense, it represents a constructive step to which we have given consideration in our own thinking. The logic of this proposal

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argues that the Soviets should be able to accept our proposal for a Protocol ban on all new types, which would impose equal constraints on both sides.

As for SLBM new types, the Soviet proposal was the same for all variants: a ban on flight testing and deployment for either the Protocol or the 1985 period, with an exception for Trident I and the Typhoon. This was not equitable. Trident I has already begun flight-testing and should be treated the same as the SS-N-18. Soviet rights to a new, untested SLBM must be balanced by equal rights for the U.S. This means that Trident II and Typhoon must be treated comparably. Either they must both be banned or both be exempted.

There was also the question of how to define a new type of ICBM, which is being addressed by the Delegations. The U.S. has made a major move in the direction of the Soviet side, so we are closer to agreement on this issue. However, significant differences remain.

0 The Secretary wanted to emphasize the importance of a prohibition  
0 on an increase in the number of reentry vehicles on existing types  
0 of ICBMs and SLBMs. The U.S. side notes the Soviet inclusion in  
3 its May 1978 proposal of the rule that in the course of moderni-  
1 zation of an existing type, the number of RVs on that type should  
0 not be increased. We welcomed this indication that the Soviets  
0 agreed that fractionation limits for ballistic missiles are a  
0 valuable part of dealing meaningfully with the new types issue.

7 In this connection, we believed each side should specify how many  
7 RVs have been tested on existing types.

3 The U.S. also regarded as important the elements of our definition  
0 of new types about restricting changes in individual stages and  
0 in the relevant characteristics of what we called the post-boost  
2 vehicle for current missiles.

3 We also believed that an exempted new type of ICBM should not  
0 have more than 10 reentry vehicles, which is the maximum number  
0 tested to date on an ICBM on either side. Similarly, if we agreed  
0 to exempt a new type of SLBM, there should be a limit on the  
0 number of reentry vehicles at 14, the maximum number tested by  
0 either side to date on an SLBM.

It was clearly important to limit the number of reentry vehicles on exempted missiles. This provision, along with the ban on increasing the number of reentry vehicles on existing ballistic missiles, would make a significant contribution to the effectiveness of a new types ban and to the stability of the strategic balance.



--There would be a prohibition on increases in the number of reentry vehicles for existing types of SLBMs. The maximum number of reentry vehicles on an exempted SLBM would be 14.

This proposal takes into account the essential elements of the approaches taken by both sides: the Soviet side wanted to ban new ICBMs through 1985, and they could be banned. We had sought to obtain equality of constraints on both sides. It is good arms control and it gives each side flexibility to structure its own forces.

In making this proposal, the Secretary wanted also to make it clear that the U.S. cannot accept a limit on the number of ALCMs carried by an aircraft limited under the 1320 ceiling, and this new proposal was contingent on Soviet agreement that there be no such limits.

As he had said, this new proposal is offered as an integrated package and cannot be broken into individual parts. We offered it in an effort to seek a fair and prompt resolution of this issue.

In conclusion, the Secretary wanted to make two points:

The United States had had no new ICBMs since the Minuteman 3, first deployed almost a decade ago. The Soviet Union has deployed several ICBMs in that period, most of them MIRVed and far larger than Minuteman 3.

The Secretary had to emphasize that by making this proposal the U.S. has made a serious and substantial political commitment to conclude a new agreement.

Gromyko suggested a recess for five or ten minutes, to enable him to consult with his Delegation on how to proceed further.

Following a brief recess, Gromyko said that he would need some time in order to examine the Secretary's proposals carefully. He would tell the Secretary now, however, that these proposals did not instill particular optimism in his mind, but he would return to them this afternoon. If acceptable to the Secretary, he would suggest they recess the talks until 3:30 p.m., at which time he thought he would be able to express Soviet considerations on the current state of negotiations and on the proposals advanced by the Secretary today. During the time before resuming their meeting at 3:30 p.m., he would have some internal work to do.

The Secretary agreed.